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Abstract  
 
This article analyzes how the Portuguese overseas empire was integrated into the 
global politics of the Hispanic monarchy. By studying the conflict of Ormuz in the 
period between 1600 and 1625 and by seeking parallels with other conflicts 
scattered throughout the different regions of the empire, it seeks to demonstrate 
that the evolution of the Portuguese overseas territories during the Iberian union 
largely depended on the geopolitical priorities of Castile, something which 
contradicts the thesis of Portuguese political autonomy that historiography has long 
defended. 
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Resumo 
 
Este artigo procura demonstrar a forma como o império ultramarino português foi 
integrado na política global da Monarquia Hispânica. Analisando o conflito de 
Ormuz no período compreendido entre 1600 e 1625 e procurando paralelismos 
com outros conflitos dispersos pelos diferentes espaços do império, procura 
demonstrar que a evolução dos territórios ultramarinos portugueses durante a 
União Ibérica dependeu largamente das prioridades geopolíticas de Castela, algo 
que vem contradizer a tese da autonomia durante muito tempo defendida pela 
historiografia. 
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Introduction 
 
The conflict of Ormuz at the beginning of the seventeenth century, which resulted 
in the Portuguese defeat in 1622 and in the consequent loss of this important eastern 
fortress, is a topic that has been studied almost exclusively in terms of its direct relationship 
with the decline of the Portuguese empire in Asia. However, the integration of Portugal 
into the Hispanic monarchy (1580-1640) makes it necessary to consider the global 
equilibrium of the Habsburg Empire throughout this period. The main purpose of this 
article is therefore to demonstrate how the question of Ormuz was dealt with in Madrid, 
while also seeking to understand in what way the evolution of the Portuguese position in 
the Persian Gulf was conditioned by the perception of, and the importance attributed to, 
the region in the global politics of the Habsburgs. 
For a long time, the effects of the Habsburg government on the politics of the 
Portuguese empire were generally disregarded by historiographies describing the 
Portuguese overseas empire and the union of Portugal and Castile. The privileges granted 
by the Carta Patente of the Cortes de Tomar, which stipulated that the two empires would be 
kept separate, and that the kingdom of Portugal would retain its autonomy, has led 
historians to believe that the different Portuguese colonial territories evolved in isolation 
from the overall evolution of the Hispanic monarchy.2 Whenever the dynastic union was 
considered, it was only to find the Catholic monarchs responsible for all the empire’s 
misfortunes. It is true, however, that the theses of both autonomy and negligence have 
started to be gradually questioned by an impartial historiography, a historiography that is 
concerned with the impact of the Habsburg government on the political, economic, social 
and cultural framework of Portugal and its empire, and which has devoted privileged 
attention to the Iberian Atlantic world.3 However, studies about the Portuguese overseas 
territories in Asia are far rarer, and it is generally still believed that the Habsburg 
government had no influence whatsoever on the politics of the Estado da Índia and the 
succession of events that occurred in many of its territories4 (something that is immediately 
contradicted by the very existence of works such as the 1582 Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas). 
                                                            
2 There are some authors who, exceptionally, followed the early works of Alice Canabrava, Charles Boxer, 
and Stuart B. Schwartz.  
3 Pedro Cardim makes an excellent survey of the most important works about the Habsburg government and 
the Portuguese empire in the Atlantic Ocean in Cardim (2004). See also Studnicki-Gizbert (2007) and 
Marques (2009). 
4 Consider the exceptions of Subrahmanyam (1993 and 2007), Boyajian (1993), Valladares (2001), and Costa 
(2002). Because of all their interactions with Manila, the Portuguese territories in the Far East developed a 
different dynamics from the Portuguese territories in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, so that they have 
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During the union of the Portuguese and Castilian crowns, the territories of the 
Portuguese empire were administered closely by Madrid, notwithstanding the existence of 
Portuguese institutions and actors in Lisbon and Madrid whose purpose was to guarantee 
Portuguese representation in the monarchy as a whole. The Portuguese territories became 
part of a strategy that had ramifications throughout Europe and the Mediterranean, the 
Americas and the Atlantic Ocean, the Far East and the Pacific Ocean. The reason is very 
simple: the complementarity between the spaces of the two empires was too closely 
intertwined, not only geographically, but also politically and economically, making it 
impossible for Madrid to exclude the Portuguese overseas territories from its global 
politics.5 This fact was particularly crucial at a time when the immense spread of the 
Habsburg realm was beginning to reveal certain weaknesses, and when the challenges 
presented by the growing competition of the North European maritime powers were 
gradually multiplying. Indeed, the administration of the Portuguese empire during the 
Habsburg government cannot be conceived of as existing outside the political and 
administrative framework of the Habsburgs, with all of their interests, strategies, and 
priorities. 
However, the Portuguese overseas empire was a far-reaching structure, with 
territories scattered throughout several different regions in the Americas, Africa, the Indian 
Ocean, the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia, and the Far East. Some of these regions were 
naturally closer to the core interests of the monarchy, and it was only natural that Madrid 
concentrated most of its attention on those territories. When dealing with the many 
challenges of the Portuguese overseas territories, Madrid acted according to an informal 
hierarchy of priorities, dictated by the Castilian perception of each territory and the way in 
which they affected the central interests of the monarchy. 
What was the place of Ormuz and the Persian Gulf in this hierarchy? How was this 
region perceived in Madrid? How was this perception expressed in the discussions and the 
specific policies developed for the region? These are the three questions that this article 
seeks to answer. In order to do so, it analyzes the conflict of Ormuz and examines how it 
was dealt with at the heart of the decision-making process, while seeking parallels with the 
way in which these same administrative centers regarded other Portuguese colonial 
                                                                                                                                                                              
tended to receive greater attention from historians such as, for instance, João Paulo Oliveira e Costa, Manel 
Ollé, and Manuel Lobato, to give just a few examples. 
5 This is not to say that there was not an inter-imperial complementarity both before and after the union of 
the Portuguese and Castilian crowns. However, viewed from the standpoint of the European balance of 
power at the end of the 16th century, by integrating Portugal and its empire into his already extensive realm, 
Filipe II was explicitly reinforcing the power of the monarchy and the integrity of his empire in all of its 
geographic extensions. See Bouza (2005: 39-51). 
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territories that were also under threat. The territories chosen for comparison are those of 
Macao and Bahia. Like Ormuz, these territories were extremely important strongholds 
within the Portuguese Overseas Empire in the first quarter of the seventeenth century and 
were also crucial for the strategic objectives of the North European overseas powers 
during the period in which the conflict of Ormuz evolved.  
This article focuses on the decision-making process and the political discussions 
taking place in the centers of decision. This process was largely based on information that 
reached Madrid about imminent threats throughout the imperial world. Such threats 
frequently did not materialize, but this does not mean that they did not influence the 
policies adopted for the defense and administration of the different colonial territories. 
A brief reference should be made to the way in which this article is organized: it 
begins by demonstrating the different perceptions and interests that the Portuguese and the 
Castilians had in relation to Ormuz and the Persian Gulf. It then analyzes some of the 
tensions that resulted from the different perceptions that were formed of the region, 
namely those that characterized the episodes relating to the embassies of Don García da 
Silva y Figueroa and Rui Freire de Andrade, 6  which involved aspects such as the 
management of the available resources and the articulation of the political process between 
the different poles of the empire. Finally, it analyzes the debate about possible Portuguese 
and Castilian military cooperation in the defense and recovery of Ormuz when compared 
to its successes in other regions of the empire. 
 
The Portuguese and Castilian perceptions of, and interests in, the Persian Gulf 
 
The Portuguese and the Castilians undoubtedly had different perceptions of the 
Persian Gulf, just as their interests were also different. While the Portuguese were focused 
on the structure of the Portuguese presence in Asia, the Castilians were focused on the 
Mediterranean. For the Portuguese, Ormuz was an important part of the Estado da Índia.7 It 
was a crucial cornerstone of the commercial system that had enriched the Portuguese 
treasury during much of the sixteenth century. It is possible that the prosperity of the 
                                                            
6 Episodes such as the ambiguous involvement of the Sherley brothers, Anthony and Robert, the role of 
religious envoys such as Frei António de Gouveia or Frei Belchior dos Anjos, and the complex negotiations 
of the Persian silk trade, are also crucial for understanding this problematics (see Borges, 2009).  
7 The political and economic importance of Ormuz in the 16th and early 17th century has been discussed by 
Borges (2009). One of the most important contributions regarding the kingdom of Ormuz still remains the 
article by Jean Aubin, who, among other aspects, has analyzed its relationship with Safavid Persia (Aubin, 
2000). Excellent overviews of the political and economic relations between Safavid Persia and the Persian 
Gulf have been provided by Rudi Matthee (1999) and Willem Floor (2006). 
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Ormuzian customs house during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was exaggerated 
by contemporary observers or even by some historians, but, given the confluence here of 
the great riches of the most important Eurasian maritime and continental trade routes, the 
significance of its profits for the economic structure of the Estado da Índia was 
unquestionable. In the 1620s, the economic importance of Ormuz was still quite 
considerable, since it continued to play a central role in long-distance trade. Its connections 
with the other important ports in Eastern trade were quite considerable and the profits 
recorded at its customs house in 1610 and 1620 were indeed remarkable (Cunha, 1995: 
118-120, 127, 129; Subrahmanyam, 1993: 222). It is also important to note that, in the 
second decade of the seventeenth century, when the Estado da Índia undertook a general 
sale of offices to generate money to cope with the multiple challenges and financial 
difficulties that it faced, the offices relating to Ormuz were still largely superior to all the 
other offices available, including those in Malacca, Goa or Diu. In 1614, for example, the 
office of captain of the fortress of Ormuz was sold to Dom Luís da Gama for 145,000 
xerafins, whereas the same office at fortresses as important as Malacca, Goa or Diu was sold 
for 30,030, 10,500, and 53,000 xerafins respectively, which demonstrates that, by the second 
decade of the seventeenth century, when the situation of the Portuguese in the region was 
already being widely debated in Madrid, Ormuz was still considered one of the most 
important fortresses in the Estado da Índia. 
Despite the high values put forward by historians such as João Teles e Cunha and 
Sanjay Subrahmanyam, which are in line with the estimates of Vitorino Magalhães 
Godinho (Godinho, 1982: 44-50), the situation in Ormuz became more and more critical8. 
Several factors came together to increase the fears about its conservation and to raise 
doubts regarding its profitability. The fall in profits was due to the increased expenses 
associated with the fortress’s maintenance (such as military expenses, for example), the 
decrease in commercial traffic caused by the general instability in the region, the increased 
taxes imposed by the Portuguese authorities on non-Portuguese merchants, the increase in 
smuggling, and the repeatedly reprehensible and corrupt behavior of the captain of Ormuz 
and other authorities at the customs house and the fortress,9 as demonstrated by several 
assentos of the Conselho da Fazenda of the Estado da Índia, in Goa (Cunha, 1995: 117-148).10 
                                                            
8 See the Letter from Matheo Duarte to the Duke of Villahermosa, Goa, in ANTT, SV, Caixa 19, fol. 76A. 
9 As James Boyajian has demonstrated, the lively commercial activity of Ormuz enriched the casado merchants 
who orchestrated this trade, and the local authorities that frequently disregarded royal instructions (Boyajian 
1993: 59-61). 
10 In the Historical Archives of Goa, which I visited with the generous support of Fundação Oriente, I had 
the opportunity to find several documents that demonstrated the dubious behavior of the Portuguese 
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Thus, while it is true that the gross revenue of the customs house of Ormuz did not 
decrease, its overall balance certainly did. 
However, whatever the true profits generated by Ormuz were, one cannot assess 
the fortress’s real importance without considering its symbolic value, for it was a crucial 
factor in the Portuguese perceptions of the region and also explained some of the tensions 
that arose between the Portuguese and the Castilians. 11  Furthermore, this symbolic 
importance did not exist only in the collective Portuguese imagination. It was also present 
in that of the regional and Asian powers whose trade interests somehow intersected with 
those of Ormuz, as well as in the imagination of the other European overseas powers that 
vied with the Portuguese for control of the Asian region.12 For example, in 1622, when the 
fortress had already been lost, the governor of the Estado da Índia, Fernão de Albuquerque 
warned the court that Ormuz was so renowned in the world that everyone had their eyes 
on it.13 According to the arguments of the English, who advocated the conquest of Ormuz, 
it was believed that, if the enterprise was successful, the English India Company would be 
certain of conquering the “key to all India,” something which would place the English in a 
stronger position than the Dutch and even the Muslims.14 Indeed, throughout the first 
quarter of the seventeenth century, Ormuz still enjoyed a prominent place in the European 
vision of the East. To the Portuguese, it was a motive for collective pride and imperial 
symbolism, which were being questioned by the various dynamics of a crisis that was 
gradually closing in on the Portuguese position in the region. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
authorities in Ormuz. There was a set of manuscripts recording the meetings of the Conselho da Fazenda de 
Goa that was of particular interest for the study of these dynamics. See HAG, Cód. 1159. 
11 The “imperial symbolism” of Ormuz was a crucial part of the discourse of the separation movement of 
1640, the Restauração, which blamed the Habsburg government for the loss of the fortress. 
12 Assento do Conselho de Estado, Goa, March 8, 1622, in Assentos do Conselho de Estado, Vol. I, Doc. 35, pp. 
130-132. See also Herzig 1985: 6. 
13 Letter from Fernão de Albuquerque, Governor of India, to the king, Goa, March 31, 1622, in ANTT, SV, 
Caixa 19, fol. 100. See also the report Razões que ocorrem na perda de Ormuz que obrigam a que se intente cobrar-se, e as 
que confirmam o contrário, in ANTT, ML, Livro 1116, Doc. 48, fol. 544. 
14 Letter from President Fursland and the Council in Batavia to the East India Company, August 27, 1622, in 
Foster (1908: 116-118). Despite the importance of the fortress, acknowledged by the English when they 
decided to help the Persians to conquer Ormuz, historians such as Edmund Herzig, Willem Floor and 
Michael Pearson have already demonstrated that the English did not achieve much by helping Shah Abbas. 
Relations between the Shah and the English (as much as with any other hypothetical European partner) were 
full of ambiguities and tensions. According to Edward Monnox’s report, the Shah forced the English into the 
alliance by threatening to confiscate their goods in Persia. Furthermore, after the profitable years of 1620-
1623, the Persian silk trade proved to be less profitable than the English had believed when they agreed to the 
alliance, since the Shah’s conditions were not very beneficial to them. This trade was even suspended in 1622. 
Furthermore, the English were also fooled by the promises of the division of all the profits from the Ormuz 
customs house, since, after the conquest, Shah Abbas transferred all of its commercial activity to the port of 
Bandar Abbas, in the Persian interior. See Edward Monnox’s História Geral da Tomada da Fortaleza de Ormuz, in 
Craesbeeck (1940: 323-362); Herzig (1985); Floor (1996); Matthee (1999); and Pearson (2008). 
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To the Habsburgs, regardless of the many legends that had earned the Ormuzian 
markets their famous reputation, Ormuz in itself did not seem to be especially relevant for 
the interests and politics of the monarchy. It was not because of Ormuz or the lively 
activity of its customs house that making an approach to Safavid Persia was of interest to 
Madrid. The interests of the Habsburgs in having contacts with Persia dated from long 
before this, and involved the Papacy and other European princes. Since they represented 
the most declared rival of the Ottoman Empire to the west of the Mediterranean, the 
possibility of an alliance with the greatest enemy of the Sublime Porte to the east of its 
frontiers was believed to be quite profitable to the Habsburg interests in the 
Mediterranean, not only because of its claims to enjoy a hegemonic political status, but also 
because of its mission as a representative and spreader of Catholicism. Through the union 
with Portugal, and by extending his power as far as the Persian Gulf, the Catholic king 
attained a highly advantageous position in the region, since he now enjoyed new 
opportunities for approaching Persia and for engaging in a joint action on two fronts 
against the Ottoman Empire (Bouza, 2005: 43; Costa and Rodrigues, 1992: 322-323). Thus, 
through successive diplomatic efforts, the Habsburg monarchs promised to channel their 
forces into the Mediterranean and to attack the Ottomans through the Levant, 
simultaneously agreeing to garner the support of the European Catholic princes, who were 
their allies in this undertaking.15 As for the Safavid monarch, he would attack his Ottoman 
rival across the borders of both kingdoms. The Castilian kings believed that this would be 
the necessary strategy to bring an end to the Ottoman threat in the Mediterranean or, at 
least, to weaken it. In the instructions that the Catholic king gave to the ambassador Don 
García da Silva y Figueroa, the Habsburg priorities were made very clear and Ormuz 
appeared almost as a collateral objective of the embassy’s true intentions.16 Indeed, if 
keeping the island under Portuguese control facilitated the Habsburg strategy in the 
Mediterranean region, its loss did not in any way jeopardize their making an approach to 
Persia, nor was it a direct threat to any Castilian colonial territory. Ormuz was not 
considered fundamental. 
Nonetheless, in this first quarter of the seventeenth century, for the Portuguese, the 
obligation of using the Estado da Índia’s scarce military resources in a war that was not their 
                                                            
15 This was also a strategy that had been followed by the Portuguese right from the very first moment that 
they set foot on the island at the beginning of the 16th century, as the studies by Jean Aubin and Dejanirah 
Couto have demonstrated. In time, this became more of a rhetorical discourse and a strategy pursued in order 
to covet the Shah’s goodwill towards the Portuguese presence in Ormuz and the Persian Gulf. 
16 Royal instructions from Filipe III to the ambassador Don García de Silva y Figueroa, San Lorenzo, August 
9, 1613, in ED, Doc. 14, pp. 183-185. See also Gil Fernández (2009: 260-267). 
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own did not seem a priority and it was not at all an appealing exercise. Despite the 
ideological opposition in matters of religion and after the Ottoman Empire’s presumably 
expansionist movement towards the Indian Ocean, which had marked the relations 
between the two powers throughout the sixteenth century, the relations between the 
Portuguese and the Ottomans during the first two decades of the seventeenth century had 
remained neutral, if not actually positive. The joint undertaking, if carried out, would 
concentrate the Portuguese forces in the Persian Gulf, demanding their exclusive attention, 
when they were, in fact, needed everywhere in the Estado da Índia (Cunha 1995: 43). 
Hence, as far as the Persian Gulf was concerned, there was a clear divergence 
between the priorities of the Portuguese and the priorities of the Castilians. While the 
attention of the former was directed towards the Indian Ocean and Asia, with Ormuz, 
because of its political and economic value, being crucial to the maintenance of the Estado 
da Índia; the Castilian interests were clearly concentrated in the Mediterranean region, and 
Ormuz was important only in the sense that it facilitated an approach to Persia, which was, 
in turn, fundamental to the balance of power in the Mediterranean. This divergence of 
interests and the different perceptions that they caused about regional circumstances were 
to be expressed in the policies adopted by the Habsburgs in the region and in the reactions 
of the Portuguese towards these same strategies. A reaction that was often negative. 
 
The embassy of Don García de Silva y Figueroa 
 
The growing instability in the region meant that the priorities and interests of both 
Portuguese and Castilians needed to be contemplated in the policies adopted by Madrid, 
but not without some considerable tensions. We could say that these tensions were related 
to two aspects that were, to a certain extent, contradictory. Tensions arose when, on the 
one hand, there was greater interference by Madrid in matters that the Portuguese 
considered should be their sole responsibility as far as the administration of their empire 
was concerned; and, on the other hand, when the Portuguese did not receive from Castile 
the desired response to the multiple and continuous appeals and cries for help issuing from 
the Estado da Índia. 
Because it was a sensitive issue in the relations between the Portuguese and the 
Castilians, the conflict of Ormuz gave rise to a considerable amount of discussion at the 
court. A specific junta was even created to deal with matters relating to Ormuz and Persia 
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(García Hernán, 2010: 239). The Junta da Pérsia17 comprised two members of the Consejo de 
Estado and two members of the Conselho de Portugal, a move that was probably designed to 
reduce the divergences between the Portuguese and the Castilians. For this reason, one of 
the main issues that the junta had to deal with was the complex embassy of Don García de 
Silva y Figueroa, the Habsburg ambassador to Persia from 1614 to 1619.18 
 When Filipe III and his Consejo de Estado decided to send a Castilian 
nobleman as an ambassador to Persia, partly because Shah Abbas I, the ruler of Persia, did 
not want any more friars representing the Habsburgs at his court,19 the Portuguese reaction 
(in Madrid, Lisbon, and also Goa) was naturally extremely negative, causing reverberations 
throughout Don García’s mission.  
The initial intention of the Consejo de Estado was that this embassy should perform 
better than the previous one headed by Portuguese friars such as Dom António de 
Gouveia or Luís Pereira de Lacerda, in displaying the Habsburg power, and that the costs 
of the embassy would be shared by Castile and Portugal. Castile would pay the costs of the 
journey until Lisbon; and Portugal would pay the expenses of transporting the embassy 
from Lisbon to Goa. The Conselho de Portugal, however, refused to pay these expenses and 
even questioned the convenience of the embassy. The reason invoked by the Portuguese 
was the difficult financial situation in both Lisbon and India, but, regardless of the veracity 
of such complaints, the true motive for the Conselho de Portugal’s refusal was undoubtedly 
the Castilian origins of the ambassador. The Consejo de Estado, in turn, seemed determined 
to send the embassy. It now proposed paying for all the initial costs and ordering the 
viceroy of India, Dom Jerónimo de Azevedo, to provide Don García with all that was 
necessary after his arrival in Goa. However, as if already foreseeing the unwelcome 
reception that the Castilian diplomat would receive in Goa, where the viceroy did 
everything he could to hinder his mission, Dom Cristóvão de Moura suggested, at a 
meeting of the Consejo de Estado on October 27, 1613, that the envoy should take with him a 
secret credit, a proposal that was supported by the other members of the Consejo de Estado. 
                                                            
17 We do not know much about the Junta da Pérsia, and the little that it is known results from some fairly 
scattered documentation. See, for example, AGS, Secretarías Provinciales, Lg. 1467. Luis Gil Fernández 
gathered together some documents referring to the Junta da Pérsia in his Epistolario Diplomático – see, for 
instance, Documents 70, 75, 76, 77, and 78. 
18 For a biographical synthesis of the life of Don García de Silva y Figueroa, see Gil (2011: 3-59). For more 
information about the embassy of Don García, besides the earlier works of Carlos Alonso and Luis Gil 
Fernández, see the more recent studies by Gil Fernández (2009: 241-358), and Loureiro and Resende (2011a). 
The Castilian nobleman also wrote an extensive report of his journey and his mission in Persia, Comentários de 
Don García de Silva y Figueroa. See also the recent edition by Loureiro, Gomes and Resende (2011b). 
19 See Relación de la consulta inclusa de la Junta que trata de las cosas de Persia, March and April 1620, in ED, Doc. 
77, pp. 281-282. See also Lockhart (1986: 392). 
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Don García should keep this credit secret so that the Conselho de Portugal would not suspect 
that it existed, and he should only resort to it in the event of extreme necessity, if the 
viceroy of India refused to comply with the payment instructions received from Madrid 
(Gil Fernández, 2009: 253-255). 
Don García’s passage through Goa was indeed a most troubled affair because of 
the difficult relationship that he had with the viceroy, Dom Jerónimo de Azevedo, and the 
Portuguese authorities in general, who did not disguise the discomfort that they felt in 
accepting a Castilian nobleman to represent Portuguese interests in the Estado da Índia and 
Ormuz. In his correspondence with the kingdom, the Castilian ambassador often 
complained about the way in which he was treated.20 It seems that Dom Jerónimo de 
Azevedo did everything he could to obstruct Don García’s journey to Ormuz. The 
Castilian nobleman even requested that the viceroy of India should be punished for his 
disobedience and the lack of respect that he had shown towards Filipe III. This was yet 
another discussion that took place between the Consejo de Estado and the Conselho de Portugal, 
which once again highlighted the divergences between the two councils. The Consejo de 
Estado maintained that the behavior of Dom Jerónimo de Azevedo should be investigated 
and, if his misconduct was confirmed, that he should be punished. The Conselho de Portugal, 
in turn, believed that the viceroy of India had acted out of what he considered to be his 
duty and that, as such, he should not be reprehended (let alone punished).21 
Don García continued to pursue his complaints, saying that Don Jerónimo de 
Azevedo did not provide him with enough money (nor with the sum that had previously 
been stipulated) to travel to Ormuz and Persia. 22  The ambassador wrote to Madrid 
requesting financial support to either travel to Persia or return to Castile. Foreseeing the 
reluctance of the Conselho de Portugal to gather together the sum requested by Don García, 
the Consejo de Estado advised the king to take this money from the crown of Castile, so that 
the ambassador could proceed with his embassy and mission as urgently as possible.23 
                                                            
20 Report to the Consejo de Estado summarizing the letters exchanged between Don García de Silva y Figueroa 
and Frei Belchior dos Anjos, November-December 1616, in ED, Doc. 59, pp. 262-264. 
21 Letter from Don García de Silva y Figueroa to Juan de Ciriza, Goa, December 24, 1616, in ED, Doc. 38, p. 
245; Parecer of the Consejo de Estado delivered to the king, April 27, 1616, in ED, Doc. 50, pp. 255-256; Report 
to the Consejo de Estado about two consultas received from the Conselho de Portugal, October-November 1616, in 
ED, Doc. 57, pp. 260-261; Parecer of the Consejo de Estado delivered to the king, December 16, 1617, in ED, 
Doc. 67, p. 274; and Parecer of the Consejo de Estado delivered to the king, August 30, 1618, in ED, Doc. 69, 
pp. 275-276. 
22 Letter from Don García de Silva y Figueroa to Dom Jerónimo de Azevedo, Goa, October 28, 1616, in ED, 
Doc. 33, pp. 233-234; and Letter from Dom Jerónimo de Azevedo to Don García de Silva y Figueroa, 
November 1, 1616, in ED, Doc. 35, p. 236. 
23 Parecer of the Consejo de Estado delivered to the king, July 25, 1617, in ED, Doc. 62, pp. 270-271. 
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Madrid’s diligent financial sponsorship of Don García’s embassy is even more 
revealing if we consider the contribution that the Consejo de Estado proposed to make to the 
efforts of recovering Ormuz after its capture by Anglo-Persian forces. Acknowledging the 
need to recover Ormuz, the council suggested that the treasury of Portugal should provide 
everything that it possibly could, and that there was no reason for Castile to contribute 
anything more than the remainder.24 The difference in the amounts that the Consejo de 
Estado was prepared to contribute towards each of these two enterprises is more than 
evident.  
 
Links between policies in Madrid, Lisbon, Goa and Ormuz 
 
Don García’s embassy was also hampered by the difficulty of harmonizing the 
decision-making processes throughout the empire. Indeed, despite the many orders sent 
from Madrid to Goa demanding that Dom Jerónimo de Azevedo should provide money 
to Don García, the viceroy of India ignored these as much as he could. Orders from the 
kingdom would arrive in India, where they often fell on deaf ears. Dom Jerónimo de 
Azevedo, like other viceroys, governors and authorities in the Estado da Índia, often 
managed its finances according to his own interests, or at least according to the interests 
and issues that he considered most urgent. The viceroy, it would seem, reserved for Don 
García only a small part of what had been promised to the ambassador before he left the 
Habsburg court. The king’s decision was limited by the relative freedom and autonomy 
enjoyed by the viceroy while exercising his power.25 Undoubtedly, the difficulty of 
articulating royal decisions with the habits and modus operandi of the local authorities 
had always been a feature of the Estado da Índia’s way of working, and it tended to 
restrict the scope of metropolitan policies. 
On the other hand, it was not infrequent for the decisions taken by the central 
political bodies to be far removed from the geopolitical realities of the various territories 
of the Estado da Índia. In spite of the circulation of information and the assiduous 
exchange of correspondence between the Estado da Índia and the metropolis, it is 
possible that the reality of life in Ormuz and the Persian Gulf was not fully known and 
                                                            
24 Parecer of the Marquis de Aytona expressed in the consulta of the Consejo de Estado, Madrid, January 5, 1623, 
AGS, Lg. 2645. 
25 Letter from the viceroy of India, Dom Jerónimo de Azevedo, to Don García de Silva y Figueroa, Goa, 
November 1, 1616, in ED, Doc. 35, p. 236; letter from Don García de Silva y Figueroa to the viceroy of 
India, Dom Jerónimo de Azevedo, Goa, November 28, 1616, in ED, Doc. 36, pp. 237-238; letter from Don 
García de Silva y Figueroa to the king, Filipe III, Goa, December 24, 1616, in ED, Doc. 37, pp. 238-244.  
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understood in the main metropolitan decision-making centers. The Iberian Union and 
the consequent imposition of Madrid as the center of political decision-making made 
the process even more complex. 
In response to the alarming news that came from Goa about the deplorable state 
of the Estado da Índia, the increasingly explicit intentions of Shah Abbas I towards 
Ormuz, and the threatening maneuvers of the English ships in the Persian Gulf, Filipe 
III ordered a fleet to be sent to Ormuz. The commander-in-chief of this fleet was Rui 
Freire de Andrade.26 The Habsburg monarch dispatched the Portuguese nobleman at a 
time when the relations between the Iberians and the Shah were visibly deteriorating, 
and when it was urgent to pacify them. Consequently, Filipe III was very explicit when 
he ordered that Rui Freire de Andrade should undertake careful management of such 
ticklish relations, and that he should fight only with European enemies, and not with the 
Persians or other vassals of the Shah, with whom friendly relations should be 
maintained.27 
But Rui Freire’s royal instructions also included the ambiguous task of fortifying 
Qishm,28 the fertile island in front of Ormuz, which was the main source of Ormuz’s daily 
provisions and which was crucial to the maintenance of this fortress. These orders, 
however, had one particular aspect: they should be implemented without provoking the 
Shah. For those who were familiar with the ways in which the balance of power was 
maintained in those parts of the world, such as the then-governor of India, Fernão de 
Albuquerque, it was evident that fortifying the island of Qishm without provoking Shah 
Abbas would be an impossible task. For all intents and purposes, Qishm, which had been 
reoccupied by the Persian forces of Allaverdi Khan in 1608, was a Persian territory and the 
Portuguese presence on the island challenged and called into question the Shah’s 
sovereignty over it. At such a delicate moment in the relations between the Iberians and the 
Persians, this provocation would almost certainly rekindle the flames of a long-standing 
dispute. The Portuguese did in fact recover Qishm in 1621, but this action only gave the 
Anglo-Persian alliance the pretext to attack the island, and the Portuguese were forced to 
surrender in February 1622. With Qishm back in the Shah’s hands, the English and the 
                                                            
26 On the episode involving Rui Freire de Andrade, see Couto and Loureiro (2007: 82-113), and Floor (2006: 
226-230). 
27 Royal instructions of Filipe III to Rui Freire de Andrade, Madrid, January 15, 1619, in Craesbeeck (1940: 
289-295). 
28 Relación de la consulta inclusa de la Junta que trata de las cosas de Persia, March and April, 1620, in ED, Doc. 77, 
pp. 281-282. 
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Persians could refocus their joint attention on Ormuz, defeating and expelling the 
Portuguese in May 1622.29 
 In a situation of imminent conflict, building a fortress in the enemy’s 
territory, which in itself was a provocative expression of warlike aggression, could only 
result in retaliation. It must therefore be asked: was Madrid so completely alienated from 
the regional reality that it did not foresee the consequences of attempting to establish a 
fortress on Qishm? It would seem so. There does appear to have been a certain lack of 
awareness on the part of the Castilian decision-making bodies that normally advised the 
king (namely the Consejo de Estado) about what was at stake in the Persian Gulf and about 
the way in which the regional balance of power was generally maintained (Couto and 
Loureiro, 2007: 99). There were certainly many factors contributing to this lack of 
awareness, such as the distance involved, the difficulty and slowness of communications 
between the empire’s various political centers, and the lack of contact that the ministers at 
the courts of Madrid and Portugal had with the concrete reality of the different overseas 
territories (many of them had never actually stepped very far from the court itself), but 
also, undeniably, the relationship of mutual distrust between the Portuguese and the 
Castilians within the framework of the union of their two crowns. 
 Such distrust seems to have played an important role in the Consejo de 
Estado’s difficulty in apprehending the true circumstances of the relationship between the 
Portuguese and the Persians in the region. It cannot be denied that, during the first two 
decades of the seventeenth century, news about the region arrived at the court in great 
abundance, through diverse channels and in a variety of forms. However, some of the 
members of the Consejo de Estado were wary about the truthfulness of the news that told of 
the opening of hostilities by the Shah. In a report produced by the Consejo de Estado about 
the news that had been provided by the Conselho de Portugal, and which discussed the 
obstacles faced by Don García throughout his embassy, Don Agustín Messía raised the 
possibility that the information was not in fact true.30 At the same time, the governing elites 
of the Estado da Índia were aware of the mistrust expressed by the court’s ministers. In a 
letter that he wrote to Fernão de Albuquerque, Dom Frei Cristóvão de Lisboa, the 
Archbishop of Goa between 1612 and 1622, criticized the endeavors of Rui Freire de 
Andrade and underlined how unnecessary it was to build a fortress in Qishm, a move that, 
in his opinion, would always be more harmful than beneficial. In the same letter, the 
                                                            
29 For more information about the succession of events leading to the expedition to Qishm and the loss of 
Ormuz, see Couto and Loureiro (2007: 89-99), and Floor (2006: 227-229). 
30 Parecer of the Consejo de Estado delivered to the king, April 27, 1616, in ED, Doc. 50, pp. 255-256. 
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Archbishop revealed how displeased he was with the lack of confidence demonstrated by 
the king towards the authorities of the Estado da Índia, which contrasted with the 
overconfidence that he seemed to place in his advisers at the court.31 This mutual distrust 
was but one of the many obstacles faced by Ormuz in the efforts to ensure its defense. 
 
Iberian Cooperation and the Defense of the Empire 
 
This was, in fact, a difficult time for the Portuguese overseas territories as a whole. 
During the first quarter of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese Empire faced several 
challenges, both in terms of guaranteeing sufficient resources and ensuring its own defense. 
The English alliance with the Shah was paralleled by the growing threat from the Dutch 
both in the Far East and in the Atlantic. In view of these multiple challenges, the notion of 
Luso-Castilian military cooperation overseas gradually grew in strength. The idea of 
bringing subjects of both crowns together to form a common military force was not new, 
and there were already precedents in the episodes of the Great Armada, and the dispatch of 
Portuguese troops to Flanders. 
In the Estado da Índia, the weaknesses were particularly evident, and the Portuguese 
were now desperate for an initiative that could combine in the same fleet the Castilian 
military potential and the scarce Portuguese resources.32 However, in Madrid, the general 
feeling of ill will with which the Portuguese received Castilian military collaboration was 
well known. When the possibility of combining Portuguese and Castilian forces in the 
efforts to recover Ormuz was discussed in the Consejo de Estado, the ministers warned of the 
difficulties of bringing about such an endeavor.33  
Nonetheless, this cooperation was seen as the possible solution to a long-standing 
problem faced by the Portuguese Overseas Empire: the scarcity of resources dictated the 
fate of the empire. The financial and logistical constraints were greatly aggravated by the 
growing competition from North European countries overseas, which was a problem that 
not even the sponsorship of the Hispanic Monarchy could completely resolve, since its 
own resources were also being absorbed by the multiple tensions and conflicts that it faced 
in the Iberian Peninsula, in Europe, and overseas. 
                                                            
31 Letter from Dom Frei Cristóvão de Lisboa, the Archbishop of Goa, transcribed in Cordeiro (1896: 197-
199). See also Boxer (1935: 77-78). 
32 Letter from Fernão de Albuquerque, the Governor of India, to the king, Goa, March 31, 1622, ANTT, SV, 
Caixa 19, fol. 100.  
33 Consulta of the Consejo de Estado, Madrid, January 5, 1623, AGS, Lg. 2645. 
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Although there were abundant discussions held about such cooperation during this 
period, they rarely went much beyond pure rhetoric, something that proved to be 
particularly true as far as the defense of Ormuz was concerned. Despite the apparent 
willingness of Castile, Portugal and the Estado da Índia to assemble a Luso-Castilian fleet to 
retrieve the fortress, the enterprise was never carried out. In the efforts to recover Ormuz, 
it was the Portuguese treasury and the Estado da Índia that bore most of the expenses.34 
This is not to say, however, that it was impossible ever to implement a project of 
Iberian military cooperation overseas. It was not. Such an endeavor depended on the 
interests and priorities of the Hispanic monarchy. This is very clear when we look at other 
conflicts that occurred in the Portuguese Empire during the same period, and which offer a 
glimpse of how the different Portuguese overseas territories were integrated into the global 
politics of the Habsburgs. 
This assumption has to be seen within the context of the historiographical 
understanding of the Iberian Union’s effects on the evolution of the Portuguese Overseas 
Empire. For a long time, it was believed that the administration of each of the Portuguese 
overseas territories remained unaffected by their integration into the Hispanic Monarchy. 
Such a view may have been formed because historians have tended to place their faith in 
the thesis of negligence, according to which the Portuguese colonial territories did not 
mean much to the Habsburgs in political terms, or it may have been because they believed 
that the privileges of autonomy were actually fully enjoyed throughout this period, which 
would mean that the Portuguese alone decided on the policies affecting their empire, 
separately from Madrid. Although recent historiography has gradually begun to question 
these two premises, there are still only a few studies that consider the global dynamics of 
the integration of the Portuguese Empire into the Hispanic Monarchy. The global 
dynamics of this integration partly explains the failure to put together an Iberian fleet to 
bring relief to Ormuz, while also explaining the success of this initiative in other parts of 
the empire, such as Macao or Bahia.  
Unlike what was long defended, the global stability of the Portuguese Empire 
became a very important issue for the monarchy’s overall strategy. However, the various 
Portuguese colonial territories did not have the same importance individually for the 
policies developed by Madrid. There were some territories that were more central to 
Habsburg politics, and others that were more peripheral. Each of the Portuguese colonial 
                                                            
34 See Apresentação da Contrariedade de Jorge de Albuquerque, Goa, September 10, 1624, and Certidão dos 
socorros enviados a Ormuz passada por António Saraiva de Lucena, escrivão da matrícula geral do Estado da 
Índia, Goa, September 23, 1622, in Cordeiro (1896: 183-184, 210-211). 
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territories had its own relative position in Castile’s hierarchy of priorities, depending on its 
political and economic importance for the monarchy. Such a position could be influenced 
by the fact that they were geographically closer to the Castilian territories, and thus more 
important for their military defense or support, or it may have been influenced by the fact 
that they were essentially more profitable to the economy of the empire, and thus more 
important for the equilibrium of the monarchy, in the sense that these profits served to 
prevent Portugal and its many overseas difficulties from absorbing the monarchy’s scarce 
resources. In other cases, it may have been because they were strategically located in 
regions where it was necessary to restrain the advances of the English, and especially the 
Dutch. The Portuguese, nonetheless, did not always perceive this central/peripheral 
“categorization” in the same way. In many ways, the different perceptions of some of the 
Portuguese overseas territories eventually limited the autonomy that the Portuguese 
enjoyed in the management of their overseas affairs. 
In 1622, a Dutch fleet composed of 15 ships, two of which were English, launched 
a surprise attack on the Portuguese territory of Macao. Despite their superior numbers and 
the element of surprise, the Dutch were defeated. This was a great victory for the 
Portuguese and was lauded by contemporary chroniclers, who included in their narratives a 
mention of the Castilian support received from Manila. According to a contemporary 
account of the Portuguese victory, when Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho, the governor of 
Macao, who was aware of the territory’s lack of artillery, learned of the imminence of the 
Dutch attack, he sent a ship to Manila asking for urgent assistance from its governor. 
Support arrived in the form of a few pieces of artillery and one hundred Castilian soldiers.35 
Later on, at a meeting of the Consejo de Estado, the Castilian ministers suggested that the 
governor of the Philippines should be thanked for the support he had sent to Macao, 
adding that the Castilian assistance was the sole reason for its successful defense.36 
In 1624, a powerful Dutch fleet attacked Salvador da Bahia, the capital of Brazil, 
capturing the city from the Portuguese. When the news of the fall of Bahia reached Madrid, 
a fleet composed of Castilian and Portuguese ships was immediately put together and sent 
to Brazil. The number of Castilian ships was even greater than the number of Portuguese 
ships. Nearly one year later, Salvador da Bahia was recovered in what came to be known as 
the successful expedition of the “Voyage of the Vassals.”37 When the ministers of the Consejo 
de Estado and the Conselho de Portugal met in Madrid to decide what form of relief should be 
                                                            
35 About the Dutch attack on Macao, see Boxer (1991). 
36 Consulta of the Consejo de Estado, Madrid, November 11, 1623, DUP II, Doc. 128, pp. 487-489. 
37 On the “Voyage of the Vassals”, see Schwartz (1991); and Marques (2011). 
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sent to Bahia, they agreed that the enterprise did not exclusively concern the crown of 
Portugal. For the court’s ministers, it was clear that the Dutch presence in Brazil would 
allow them to “infest” the Rio de la Plata, Buenos Aires, and even Peru, not only with 
“arms”, but also with “trade”. It was also feared that the Dutch advances into Brazil would, 
on the one hand, make it even harder to hinder illegal trade between the Castilians and the 
Dutch, and, on the other hand, that they would also ease their navigation through the Strait 
of Magellan.38 This “magnificent example of imperial association” (Kamen, 2003: 372) mirrored 
the full potential of the union of Castilian and Portuguese military resources in the colonial 
world (Schwartz, 2008: 210). For this reason, the Count-Duke of Olivares used it as the 
model for his project for the “union of arms” (Brown and Elliott, 1980: 170-171; Schwartz, 
1991: 736-737; and Oliveira, 2005: 274). 
What is the explanation for the success of Portuguese and Castilian military 
cooperation in the relief of Macao and the recovery of Bahia, and yet its failure in Ormuz? 
First of all, it cannot be denied that geographical proximity played an important 
part. It was considerably easier to relieve Macao or Bahia with the aid of Castilian 
resources, than to use them to relieve Ormuz. The proximity of Macao to the Philippines 
made the sending of Castilian support from Manila possible. The opposite was also 
expected, as the Habsburg monarchs repeatedly reminded the authorities of Macao.39 As 
for Bahia, although the remarkable celerity of the endeavor cannot be denied, this territory 
was located on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean and was able to count on the prompt 
support of the Atlantic forces of the Habsburgs. The commander of the fleet, Don 
Fadrique de Toledo, was the Commander-in-Chief of the Castilian Armada do Mar Oceano. 
Furthermore, the crossing of the Atlantic Ocean did not require the same amount of time 
or pose the same dangers as the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope and the crossing of 
the Indian Ocean. 
Secondly, in political terms, both Macao and Bahia complemented the Castilian 
imperial territories. 40  This was a crucial aspect, in the sense that, while such 
                                                            
38 Junta dos Conselheiros de Estado, Guerra e Portugal, Madrid, August 2, 1624, DUP II, Doc. 157, pp. 523-531. 
39 See, for example, the letter from Filipe III to the governor of Macao, January 23, 1608, in Boxer (1991: 
257-258). 
40 It is important to note that this political complementarity corresponded to the perceptions of the center, 
which, in themselves, were not free from tensions. In the Far East, the relations between the Portuguese and 
the Castilians were highly ambiguous. Episodes of military and logistical cooperation were permanently offset 
by episodes of rivalry dictated by the commercial and religious dynamics of the region. On the other hand, 
although the centers of decision-making (Madrid or Lisbon) had no intention of permitting trade between the 
Portuguese and Castilian territories of the Far East, the local and regional dynamics allowed for a strong 
Luso-Castilian commercial interaction. It was, as is known, the informal structures of the empire that were at 
work here, constantly contradicting the decisions taken in the center. See, for instance, Ollé (2013). 
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complementarity helped to reinforce the integrity of the Castilian colonial territories, it also 
had the ability to weaken them. The challenges faced by the Portuguese Overseas Empire 
were many and varied and Madrid had to prevent them from spreading to the Castilian 
domains. The loss of Macao would seriously endanger the Castilian territories in the 
Philippines.41 Through Macao and the Philippines both the Portuguese and the Castilians, 
respectively, were able to participate in the profitable regional trade.42 The Castilians were 
even able to link this system to their American trade,43 since the Chinese went to Manila to 
exchange silk for American silver. Furthermore, the Portuguese fortress of Malacca, in 
Southeast Asia, was also under permanent threat, and its loss would jeopardize the Castilian 
position in the Moluccas, the so-called Spice Islands. Hence, Macao and Malacca were 
crucial for the political strategy of Madrid insofar as it was believed that their defense 
would not only prevent the Dutch from taking full possession of the Moluccas, but also 
from gaining control of the southern seas, from seizing all the privileges that resulted from 
their mediating role in the trade between China and Japan, and from acquiring an easy 
route of access to New Spain, and thus also threatening Spanish America via the Pacific 
Ocean. 
As for Bahia, it was the capital of Brazil, and thus the most important Portuguese 
territory in the Atlantic region. The Atlantic potentialities of Portugal and its empire were 
of importance to the central interests and priorities of the Habsburg overseas policy in 
several ways:44 the privileged location of Lisbon in relation to Europe and the Atlantic 
world; the importance of the Portuguese coastline for the defense of the Iberian Peninsula; 
the strategic location of the islands of Madeira and the Azores, the latter being particularly 
important as a safe and functional haven for the returning Spanish silver galleons; the role 
played by the Portuguese in the profitable Atlantic trade, through their territories on the 
coast of West Africa (gold and slaves) and in Brazil (Brazilian wood and sugar). In Madrid, 
it was feared that a strong presence in Brazil might end up bringing the Dutch closer to the 
Castilian West Indies, namely the silver mines of Mexico and Peru, since, at the time, the 
distances between the two Castilian colonies and Brazil were greatly underestimated by 
                                                            
41 On the relations between the Estado da Índia and the Philippines during the Habsburg government, see, for 
example, Lobato (2013). 
42 Flynn and Giráldez (1996). 
43 Flynn and Giráldez (2002). 
44 The Habsburg period is often regarded as the time when the Portuguese Overseas Empire turned its 
attention to the Atlantic Ocean more intensely, although the awareness of the potentialities of Brazil can be 
seen to have existed some decades earlier (Schaub, 2001: 35; Subrahmanyam, 1993: 158-164). There was a 
gradual and decisive investment in the Brazilian territory and the way was opened for a profitable triangular 
trade between Portugal, Brazil and Africa (Costa, 2002: 41, 50). 
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contemporary cartography (Boxer, 1957: 15; Schwartz, 1991: 740; Cabral de Mello, 2010: 
29). Thus, for Madrid, Brazil was perceived as representing a line of protection for the 
Castilian possessions: it was, on the one hand, an easier place to attack for the overseas 
powers that disputed Castilian supremacy over the Atlantic Ocean; and, on the other hand, 
it was a base from where Castile could expect to receive rapid reinforcements, whether in 
the Caribbean, the River Plate, or the Strait of Magellan, places from where the Castilian 
West Indies were more vulnerable to attack and more accessible.45 Furthermore, in Madrid, 
there were several fears associated with the hypothetical Dutch advances into Brazil: the 
control of the Atlantic sugar trade, with all its inherent economic benefits; the assault on 
the West African coast and the consequent control of the slave trade; the seizure of yet 
another base from which to launch their privateering attacks on the Spanish silver galleons 
(not to mention the Portuguese ships of the Carreira da Índia).46 
The third aspect that determined the greater or lesser commitment towards 
resolving the challenges faced by the Portuguese Empire was the origin of the competition. 
In Macao or Bahia, the threat was Dutch; while in Ormuz, the threat came from the 
English. With the end of the Twelve Year Truce, the war for Dutch Independence was 
again being fought in Europe. The Dutch were again at the center of Madrid’s political 
strategy and their attacks on the Iberian overseas territories were considerably more 
efficient, and also more threatening to the whole stability of the monarchy.  
As for the English, the first quarter of the seventeenth century was a period of 
peace between Madrid and London (particularly after the Treaty of London, 1604). While 
the Portuguese sought to maintain control over Ormuz and to repel the Anglo-Persian 
threat in the Persian Gulf, in Europe, Castile and England negotiated a matrimonial alliance 
between the Infanta María Ana, the daughter of Filipe III and the sister of Filipe IV, and 
Charles, the son of King James I, and the Crown Prince of England. In the course of these 
negotiations, several aspects of the Anglo-Castilian relations in Europe and in the overseas 
world were discussed in Madrid, particularly the peace between the two powers, their 
military alliance against the Dutch overseas, and, among other things, the question of 
Ormuz. 
                                                            
45 Letter from the governor of River Plate, Santiago, February 19, 1618, Doc. 73, in Salvado and Miranda 
(2001: 258-259). 
46 This does not mean, however, that the Dutch were not already threatening the Castilian position in the 
Atlantic Ocean. They did so in particular through their presence in the Caribbean and even in North 
America. See Emmer (2003) and Ribeiro da Silva (2011: 334). Although, as Peter Emmer has argued, the 
Dutch empire in the Atlantic, and even its involvement in Asia, proved to be far more modest and short-lived 
than its Castilian, Portuguese or English counterparts (Emmer, 2001; Emmer, 2003), by the early 1620s, the 
Dutch advance into Brazil was greatly feared in Madrid. It was regarded as a genuine threat, and it strongly 
influenced the decision-making process regarding the Portuguese Atlantic territories. 
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The presumable alliance with the English in Asia led to further tensions between 
the Portuguese and the Castilians. The governors of the kingdom and the councilors of 
state in Lisbon opposed any approximation between the Portuguese and the English in 
India. They maintained that the trade in India should not be opened up to the English, and 
that, instead, war should be waged against them. In allowing English trade in Asia, the 
Portuguese governors and councilors of state feared that damage would be inflicted on the 
trade between the Estado da Índia and Portugal, while also fearing that the Portuguese 
reputation in Asia would be severely affected.47 In turn, the Conselho de Portugal, partly 
agreed with this position. However, although it preferred a common alliance between 
Portuguese and Castilian forces to any approximation to the English, it acknowledged the 
deplorable state of the finances of Portugal and Castile, as well as the difficulty in gathering 
enough resources to resist the power of the North European merchant companies in the 
Estado da Índia. It thus acknowledged that an alliance with the English would be the best 
way to preserve Portuguese trade in Asia and to cope with the ever greater threat from the 
Dutch that was developing in the region. Nevertheless, in order for this alliance to take 
place, the English would have to agree to certain conditions. At the top of the list was 
precisely the compensation that they should pay for the financial and symbolic damage that 
had been caused by the loss of Ormuz.48 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has sought to demonstrate that the conflict of Ormuz cannot be 
understood exclusively as being just part of the general decline of the Portuguese presence 
in Asia in the early seventeenth century. The conflict was the result of the changing global 
dynamics that were closely related with the incorporation of Portugal and its empire into 
the Hispanic monarchy. With the union of the two Iberian empires, the decision-making 
process of the Portuguese overseas territories became highly dependent on the geopolitical 
perceptions, interests and priorities of Madrid. 
A key aspect dictating the way that the Habsburgs dealt with the different 
Portuguese colonial territories was their complementarity with the Castilian colonial 
territories, not only geographically, but also politically and economically. The Portuguese 
imperial structure as a whole was, indeed, fundamental to the global stability and integrity 
                                                            
47 Letter from the councilors of state and governors of Portugal, Lisbon, February 28 1623, AGS, Lg. 2847. 
48 Consulta of the Conselho de Portugal, Madrid, March 10, 1623, AGS, Lg. 2847. 
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of the Hispanic monarchy, but there were some territories that were more important than 
others. In comparison with Ormuz, territories such as Macao or Bahia displayed strengths 
that were more important to Madrid or, at least, to the Castilian territories in the 
Philippines, the Atlantic or the Americas. In the same way, their weaknesses were more 
threatening. The perception of this importance was reflected in concrete political measures, 
such as, for example, the use of logistical and financial resources or the response adopted 
to the defensive needs of each territory. 
This does not mean, however, that the Persian Gulf region was not important for 
the global equilibrium of the Habsburg monarchy. Good relations with Safavid Persia were 
perceived as necessary to the balance of power in the Mediterranean, but they were 
possible even without Ormuz. This partly explains why the Habsburg efforts in the defense 
of the region were essentially diplomatic and why, after the loss of Ormuz, they did not 
result in the formation of a fleet composed of Portuguese and Castilian vessels, as was so 
greatly desired by the Portuguese in the Estado da Índia. Furthermore, the different 
perceptions of Ormuz, its importance, and how it should be maintained and defended, led 
to several tensions between the Portuguese actors and institutions involved in the 
administration of the empire in Goa, Lisbon or Madrid, and the Castilian institutions and 
individuals who governed this incorporated empire. It was not that Ormuz, in itself, was 
not considered valuable either politically or economically. Despite the various expenses 
associated with its defense and the effects of the conflict itself in the early seventeenth 
century, both economically and symbolically, Ormuz was still one of the most important 
fortresses and customs houses of the Portuguese Empire, not only in Asia, but also in the 
Atlantic, since we must not forget that in the collective Portuguese imagination of the early 
seventeenth century, and notwithstanding their remarkable growth, the Portuguese 
overseas extensions in the Atlantic region had not yet achieved the same splendor and 
glory as their Asian counterparts. 
The loss of Ormuz was one of the most controversial events that occurred during 
the period of union of the Portuguese and Castilian crowns. However, rather than trying to 
identify the Habsburgs as the ones to blame for such a dramatic event, as the rhetorical 
discourse of Restauração or the nationalist historiography of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries did, for example, it is pertinent to scrutinize and fully understand the 
global context in which the conflict took place. With the union of the Portuguese and 
Castilian Empires, there was a change in perceptions, interests and priorities, with both 
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positive and negative effects in all of the Portuguese overseas territories, in general, and in 
Ormuz and the Persian Gulf, in particular. 
  
Borges  The Iberian Union 
 
e-JPH, Vol. 12, number 2, December 2014  23 
Acronyms, Abbreviations and Glossary 
 
AGS: Archivo General de Simancas 
ANTT: Arquivos Nacionais da Torre do Tombo 
Consulta: Inquiry 
Caixa: Box 
Doc.: Documento 
DUP: Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa (Rego 1960-1962, Volume II). 
ED: García de Silva y Figueroa, Epistolario diplomático (Gil Fernández 1989) 
Fol.: Fólio 
Junta: Committee 
Lg.: Legajo 
Parecer: Opinion 
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